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-------------------------------------------------------------------ABSTRACT------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Abstract- Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are subject to various kinds of attacks. Deploying security 
mechanisms is difficult due to inherent properties of ad hoc networks, such as the high dynamics of their topology, 
restricted bandwidth, and limited resources in end device. With such dynamicity in connectivity and limited 
resources it is not possible to deploy centralized security solution but distribution solution.  The paper proposes 
architectural security concept in distributed manner where network is divided into clusters with one cluster head 
node each.  This cluster head node also act as a router providing proactive hidden routing by using Steganographic 
methods for inter-cluster security. Besides cipher method is used to provide intra-cluster security. The proposed 
secure architecture specifies operational view of cluster head as a router that provides trust, anonymity and 
confidentiality through Steganography and Cryptography respectively.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) allow mobile 
nodes to form a self-organized network without need for a 
permanent infrastructure.  Such networks can be used in the 
defence applications, disaster management or in remote 
locations where supportive fixed network infrastructure is 
not available. Such MNs are limited by bandwidth, 
computation and battery life. As a prerequisite to 
communication, an efficient route between network nodes 
must be established, and it must adapt to the dynamically 
changing topology of network. This dynamic property has 
rendered it vulnerable to various security attacks.  Also in 
MANETs, the privacy issue of MNs become more crucial, 
as radio resources are shared by all nodes. The node’s 
identity is exposed to the channel eavesdropping. Without 
trying to secure the identity of the nodes which have an 
important role in the clustering architecture like security 
services, the vulnerability can be exploited by attackers to 
create the Denial of Services (DoS) attacks.  Many 
solutions were proposed in literature to secure MANETs; 
however, few of them take into account the real MANET’s 
characteristicssuch as: mobility, open network, energy 
limitation, etc. 
This paper proposes security architecture for securing 
communication in MANET. Proposed approach divides the 
network into clusters and implements the decentralized 
certification authority and covert channels to hide routing 
information. Certification authority solution helps intra-
cluster security solution by using cluster-wide symmetric 
key that is known to all cluster nodes or members. Covert 
channel solution helps secure communication among 
Cluster Heads (CHs). Hence proposed secure architecture 
uses the Steganography and cryptography methods to 
provide inter-cluster and intra-cluster security.  
In this following, brief overview of related work described 
in section II. Section III provides brief view of 
Steganography, followed by clustering concept in section 
IV. Section V provides secure architecture for cluster-based 
MANET. Finally section VI provides conclusion and future 
works 
 
 
2. RELATED WORK ON SECURING MANET 
Researchers in ad hoc network security have shown various 
techniques to enhance and fortify the ad hoc routing 
protocols against various security loopholes and 
vulnerabilities in the MANET. 
Securing ad hoc networks proposed in [1] uses a distributed 
certification authority based on shared certification key and 
threshold cryptography. Our approach is based on the same 
general idea, but it is applied to cluster based network 
structure. 
A specially crafted key sharing algorithm distributing key 
among all network nodes is proposed in [2, 3], instead of 
subnets. Signed tickets issued by nodes used for access 
control. Approach proposed in [4] where every participants 
issue certificate for other nodes in a web-of-trust manner. 
Thus each participant stores a number of certificates. The 
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two nodes only communicates if local stores contains a 
certificate path between them   
Securing Clustering Algorithm (SCA) in [5] includes 
security requirements by using a trust value defining how 
much any node is trusted by its neighborhood and using the 
certificate as node’s identifier to avoid any possible attack 
like spoofing. Besides SCA forms a hierarchical structure 
for both security and routing protocols. 
Trusted communication platform for Multi-Agent System 
(MAS) in [6] shows new proactive hidden routing where 
agent discovery, route updates and hidden communication 
are cryptographically independent. Usage of 
Steganographic techniques enables secure and unrestricted 
hidden communication among multi agents and is a novel 
contribution for trusted communication between chosen 
agents using Steganographic channels. Our approach is 
based on same general idea but applied to cluster based 
network architecture.       
Due to open medium, dynamic topology, distributed 
cooperation, in MANET one of attacks called spoofing 
becomes very common [7]. Hence to prevent spoofing, a 
network Steganography is used to exploit Internet elements 
and protocols of the purpose of covertly communicating 
identity information, armed with simple cryptography [8].   
Proposed approach in this paper uses network 
Steganography for hiding routing information and 
cryptography to secure intra-cluster security.   
 
3. STEGANOGRAPHY 
In general, Steganography systems are dedicated to 
multimedia applications where hidden data is distributed in 
sound files, images and movies [9, 10, 11, and 12]. 
Steganographic solutions, located in network protocols are 
not widely spread, but they rely on usage of optional fields 
of communication protocols. However this paper t shows 
the usage of Steganography usage in network protocol  
This paper proposes Steganography in distributed router 
functionality within Cluster Head (CH), provides ability to 
create covert channels between CHs. This covert channel 
builds stego-paths between CHs.   
 
4.  CLUSTER BASED CONCEPT IN MANET 
A cluster is one of the ad hoc networks architecture where 
Cluster Head (CH) responsible of management of cluster 
and other nodes that are members to particular cluster. 
Gateways (GWs) manage communication between with 
adjacent clusters as shown in Figure 1. CHs are responsible 
to broadcast periodically beacons. These beacons contain 
administrative information for member nodes of the cluster. 
Besides GWs broadcast beacons informing their respective 
clusters about their adjacent clusters.   
The inter-clusters communication is ensured by the border 
nodes. For security reasons, not all border nodes can ensure 
the link between two clusters but they need to have a high 
trust level to get the getaway status GW, for more details 
the reader can refer to the trust model in [5] 
System. 
5. SECURING CLUSTER BASED MANET 
In proposed work CHs operate as a Certification Authority 
(CA) in distributed manner to ensure security for under 
lying cluster nodes by using cluster-wide symmetric key. A 
security of communication links within single cluster is 
provided by symmetric encryption. Through proper key 
exchange protocol CH and member nodes agree to share 
common key to prevent eavesdropping. Limiting scope 
intra-cluster security with symmetric key, this paper is 
focused to provide secure communication links between 
clusters of the MANET architecture.    
CH1
CH2
CH3
GW
GW
CH4
 
 
Figure 1 CH with random walk 
Besides behaving as a CA, CH also performs 
Steganographic communication in many ways. By using 
such Steganographic methods on different layers of OSI 
model. Examples of different layers of OSI model that 
enable covert channels includes:  multimedia and text 
hiding methods at application layer, transport layer and 
data link layer. 
Cluster gateways act as a distributed Steganographic cluster 
GW also. Connections are possible between CHs and CG 
with covert channels. However what Steganographic 
methods will be used to communicate between CH and CG 
depend on their stegano-capabilities. With ability to 
exchange information by using hidden channels all CHs in 
cluster-based architecture also acts as a distributed router 
that also supports steganographic methods. Hence CH is 
acting as a distributed router to carry/covert different covert 
channels end-to-end. It uses the distance vector protocol 
without triggered update to prevent potential attacks from 
random nodes which do not support steganographic 
methods. It also uses random walk algorithm to perform 
discovery of new CH that is in vicinity or within 
communication range.  Removed CH with intention of 
malicious attack is to observe behaviour of other nodes 
after removal then routing protocol uses triggered updates 
to inform the change in topology to other nodes. Proposed 
routing functionality uses distance vector protocol and not 
link state or hybrid one as they require greater processing 
time and memory.  This routing functionality encounters 
three operational phases such as: Neighbourhood Discovery 
phase, Exchanging routing tables and creating secure steg-
links and steg- paths. 
5.1 NEIGHBOURHOOD DISCOVERY 
During this operational phase CH sends anonymous 
message with embedded beacon consists of CH’s address 
and available steganographic methods to use for covert 
channels. Each CH maintains neighbours and routing table. 
The former table helps to create steg-link between two CHs 
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that connect them. With created steg-link in neighbourhood 
table, a periodic hello message is sent to check if the 
neighbour is still available on steg-link or not. If not then 
CH refreshes corresponding entry in routing table. If hello 
message is not received within pre-defined period, the 
corresponding steg-link gets removed from neighbourhood 
table. 
 
New 
Node
CH1
CH2
CH3CH4
GW
GW
GW
GW
GW
Anonymous message with 
content + inside Discovery steg-
message is hidden  
 
Figure 2 Discovery phase with random walk algorithm 
for new CH 
 
If new CH would like to join this cluster based architecture 
then during discovery phase following steps will be 
followed: 
• Each CH uses random walk algorithm to discover other 
CHs in Cluster-based MANET architecture. As shown in 
Figure 2, new CH attempts to connect the already 
interconnected CHs    
• Each CH and GW passes or drops the discovery steg-
message sent based on the random walk algorithm 
•  Based on the information collected during discovery 
phase, steg-links are generated between new CH and  other 
CH if their steganographic capabilities are matching 
• Two CHs become neighbours if the steg-link exits 
between them. As a result corresponding steg-link entry is 
added in new CH neighbourhood table as shown in Figure 
3. 
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Figure 3 Creating Steg-links between CHs and updating 
neighbourhood table of new CH 
 
 
• Periodic Hello message is triggered to check the existing 
steg-link. If such Hello message is responded then CH 
refreshes the entry within the neighbourhood table. If Hello 
message is not responded within a predefined time interval 
then such steg-link entry is removed from neighbourhood 
table entry.           
 
5.2ROUTING  UPDATE: EXCHANGING ROUTING UPDATE 
CH routing functionality uses covert channels to exchange 
routing tables between CHs. These updates are sent at 
regular interval to achieve proactive hidden routing. This 
proactive routing remains transparent to steganographic 
connection and discovery phase that is discussed above.  
After discovery phase, the new CH’s neighbourhood table 
posses’ actual information and it receives entire routing 
table from neighbouring CH as shown in Figure 4 
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Figure 4 Exchanging routing information between CHs 
 
As routing information is exchanged periodically between 
CHs and when new CH receives the routing tables from its 
neighbours it is able to learn about other distance CHs and 
how to reach them. With such information it can also form 
new steg-links with other CHs. 
If one of the CHs terminates or becomes passive or 
unavailable, the change is directed with hello mechanism. 
Then routing table updates and change is sent to all the 
neighbours in the neighbourhood table, when there is time 
to send the entire routing table.  
Each routing entry in the routing table represents the best 
available steg-path to distance CH with its metric. The 
metric is based on: 1) Current capacity of the steg-links 
along end-to-end steg-path; 2) Delay encountered along the 
steg-path; 3) Common steganographic methods.  
The proposed operational phases, expressed in pseudo code 
are shown in Algorithm 1.  
 New CH uses random walk algorithm and discovers CH1 
and CH2 as shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 New CH incompatibility with other CHs 
 
 
Nevertheless it is possible that two neighbouring CHs do 
not have common steganographic methods or capability 
with new CH. In this situation following functionality can 
be viewed to improve the convergence as shown in Figure 
6. 
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Figure 6 Mechanism to improve convergence to form 
steg-links 
 
In such case the CH will generate Create_steg_link to 
another CH which possess the steganographic method 
compatible with new CH. It will send Hello message to 
new CH and eventually the routing table is exchanged and 
new CH will learns about the clustering topology through 
new steg-links and steg-paths. This convergence algorithm 
is shown Algorithm 2. 
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
Paper presents concept of using Steganography in cluster-
based architecture that provides ability to create the covert 
channels between CHs. Paths and links between CHs can 
be built through steganographic methods to update routing 
table within CH. 
 
Future work should address the performance analysis of the 
proposed routing and limitations. These investigations 
allow an evaluation of proposed security architecture for 
cluster-based MANET architecture 
 
A l g o r i t h m  1  
 
randomWalkRequest ←listenCHs() 
routingUpdateRequest ←lis te nNETWORK() 
hello ←listenNETWORK() 
do 
{ 
if (randomWalkPeriod + random(fluctuationRW)exceeded) 
sendRandomWalk(myAddress, myCovertChannels) 
if (routingUpdatePeriod + random(fluctuationRU)exceeded) 
sendRoutingUpdate(myRoutingTable) 
if (helloPeriod + random(fluctuationH) exceeded) 
sendHello(myNeighboursTable) 
if (randomWalkRequest) 
{ 
if (findStegMsg(randomWalkRequest)) 
{ 
foundAddress, foundCovertChannels ← 
uncover(randomWalkRequest) 
if (isNewEntry(foundAddress, foundCovertChannels)) 
{ 
myRoutingTable ← updateMyRoutes(foundAddress, 
foundCovertChannels) 
sendRoutingUpdate(myRoutingTable) 
} 
} 
forwardRandomWalk(randomWalkRequest) 
} 
if (routingUpdateRequest and findChanges(routingUpdateRequest)) 
{ 
myRoutingTable ← upda te MyRoute s(routingUpdateRequest) 
sendRoutingUpdate(myRoutingTable) 
} 
if (hello) 
{ 
myRoutingTable ← upda te Ne ighborLa s tHe lloTime (he llo) 
} 
for each neighbor ← entry(myNeighborTable) 
if(helloTimeout(neighbor)exceeded) 
{ 
myNeighborTable ← removeEntry(neighbor) 
sendRoutingUpdate(myRoutingTable) 
} 
}while (∞) 
subroutine sendRandomWalk(address, channels) 
{ 
destination ← selectRandomAgent(myPlatform) 
sendViaMAS(destination, cover(address,channels)) 
} 
subroutine forwardRandomWalk(message) 
{ 
if (coinFlip(pf) = heads) 
{ 
destination ← selectRandomAgent(myPlatform) 
sendViaMAS(destination, message) 
} 
} 
subroutine sendRoutingUpdate(table) 
for each destination ← entry(myNeighborTable) 
sendViaNETWORK(destination, cover(table)) 
} 
 
Algorithm 2 
if (newDataToSend) 
{ 
paths ← findPathsMatch(myRoutingTable, 
destination) 
if (count(paths) > 1) 
{ 
calcMetricsForPaths(paths, capacity, delay, 
steg_method) 
BPath ← chooseBestPath(paths) 
sendData(BPath) 
} 
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else 
if (count(paths) = 1) sendData(paths) 
else noPathFound() 
} 
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